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LEGISLATIVn Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS. By Charles 0. Gregory.,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936. pp. xiii, 200. $2.
PROFESSOR GREGORY'S book contains a great quantity of extremely valuable material
and many suggestions which are more than interesting. He gives a clear, if perhaps,
overcondensed picture, of the manner in which co.Aparative negligence and contribu-
tion statutes have been administered in Canada and in the several states of the
Union. The clarity of the picture represents a triumph of exposition, in view of the
highly complex administrative problems confronting the courts which must apply
the provisions of statutes which deal both with comparative negligence and contri-
bution. A great many American judges and lawyers will agree with Professor
Gregory's condemnation of the common law rule which makes the contributory
negligence of a plaintiff a complete bar to any recovery from a negligent defendant,
and of the last clear chance doctrine which has been adopted in England and in all
but a few American states as a palliative and counter-poise thereto. He points out
that in the effort to relieve the negligent plaintiff, the entire burden of bearing the loss
is thrown upon a defendant whose fault is often little, if any, greater than that of the
plaintiff himself. In such case, the fair adjustment would seem to be by some form of
so-called "comparative" negligence statute which would enable the court and jury to
place the burden of bearing the loss upon the two in approximate proportion to the
quantum of misconduct of which they were guilty, or better, to the responsibility of
each.2
In Chapter XIV Professor Gregory suggests a form of statute by which such
liability as arises out of a single accident may be divided among the persons who
suffer because of the accident and who are responsible for it, in a way which to him
appears just. The scheme suggested is quite complex, largely because of the fact that
it includes not merely a statute providing for contribution between those tortfeasors
who are jointly or concurrently responsible for a plaintiff's injury, but also a "com-
parative negligence" statute making the plaintiff's own contributory fault a matter to
be taken into account in determining the amount of damages which he should recover.
The nearest approximation to the plan suggested he finds in the Canadian statutes,
particularly in that of the Province of Ontario. Appendix C reproduces this statute
1. Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
2. It may be doubted, however, whether the term "comparative negligence" statutes
as used by Professor Gregory is always a happy one, although the reviewer finds himgelf
unable to suggest a better. The term "comparative negligence" has become a familiar ono
in our law through a doctrine, at one time having considerable vogue in American declsions
to the effect that one guilty of slight negligence might recover from one whose negligence
was grave. It would seem therefore, that the term "comparative negligence" should be
reserved for this situation and that a statute which provides a division of loss where the
fault of plaintiff and defendant is substantially identical, is not a "comparative negligence"
statute in the sense in which that term is customarily used in American jurisprudence.
Thus, the Wisconsin statute is clearly a "comparative negligence" statute, The plaintiff
recovers nothing unless his fault is found to be less than that of the defendant. On the
other hand, the Federal Employers' Liability Act is not a true "comparative negligence"
statute. The plaintiff's negligence is a matter which affects the amount which he Is en-
titled to recover under the Act, and there is nothing to indicate that the employee's fault
must be less than that of the railroad.
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and Appendices A and 9 give a number of cases illustrative of the manner of its
administration.
The cases cited in Appendix B Professor Gregory very properly regards as con-
stituting a weak point in the Ontario system which in all other respects he appears to
deem an ideal method of loss distribution. These cases hold that the loss is not to be
distributed between a negligent plaintiff or defendant, but is to be borne by the de-
fendant alone if he had "the last clear chance" to avoid injuring the plaintiff. This
result may have been unavoidable since a Canadian court may well feel itself bound
by the analogy afforded by a simhr rule announced by the House of Lords in the
admiralty case of S. S. Volute.3 This decision is all the more regrettable, moreover,
because admiralty law had already provided a method of dividing the loss between the
injured vessel and the vessel injuring it. The division of the loss by English admiralty
courts, until the enactment of the Maritime Conventions Act of 1911 which introduced
the Continental system of making the share of each proportionate to its responsibility
for the accident, was the rough and ready one of dividing the loss to each vessel
equally between the two. While not completely satisfactory, this was far better than
the common law rule of all or none. There was, therefore, no need to engraft the
common law doctrine, obviously devised, whatever legalistic explanation may be given,
as a means of avoiding the rigor of the common law rule denying any redress to a
contributorily negligent plaintiff, upon a system of law which had already adopted the
far more intelligent method of dividing the loss between the delinquent vessels.
The writer regrets that he can not agree in toto with Professor Gregory's idea of
what constitutes an ideal distribution of loss between a number of persons involved in
a common accident, some of them sufferers only, some suffering nothing although
responsible for the accident, others both harmed and responsible. Apart from the
rather intricate mathematics involved in ascertaining the respective burdens which
each should bear, too much emphasis seems to be laid upon fault as the sale
reason for legal responsibility.4 After all tort liability is not dependent upon the
personal fault of him who must pay the damages. Many, probably the majority of
accidents are caused by the misconduct of servants for which their masters are made
vicariously responsible despite the utmost care in their selection and equipment.
There seems to be little justice in making the quantum of liability of such a master
depend upon the character of the fault of the servant in whose misconduct the
master has no real share.5
Professor Gregory's plan for the distribution of loss in its application brings about
a result which is likely to appear to ordinary lawyers, even to those lawyers who
are willing to accept new ideas if meritorious, so extraordinary as to savor of
injustice. It is possible, and indeed probable, that the bench and bar may be educated
to the point of regarding it as fair that a contributorily negligent plaintiff should re-
ceive compensation for his injuries to an extent corresponding to the nature of his
3. [1922] 1 A. C. 129.
4. It may be noted that the provision in the German Civil Code speaks of the re-p-c-
tive responsibility of the parties concerned, rather thanthelir respective fault.
5. Not only does the English and American common law impose vicarious responsibility
on persons who are altogether innocent of any personal fault, but it shows a marked ten-
dency to regard the later of two wrongdoers as being more responsible for the resulting
harm than the earlier of them. Indeed, the doctrine of novus atlts intrvenicnw, so dear
to the English lawyer's heart, is an overemphasis upon this instinctive reaction. It may
well be that Professor Gregory uses the term "culpability" as a synonym for responsibility.
If the words "fault" or "culpability" are thus understood, no great harm is done. HowJ-
ever, since culpability is merely the most important of several factors which determine
tort responsibility, it seems unfortunate to use the one word as a synonym for the other.
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contributory fault and the degree to which it contributes to his injury. It is a different
matter to educate the profession to appreciate the justice of making a negligent
plaintiff's recovery depend upon the number of persons whose concurrent fault brings
about his injury. The writer can see no advantage in a rule which, while giving to a
plaintiff guilty of a particular sort of contributory fault fifty per cent of the worth of his
injuries against a single negligent defendant, would give to the same plaintiff eighty
per cent of his loss because the injuries were caused by the concurrent effects of the
negligent conduct of four defendants each, of whose fault was identical with his own.
It may be that the writer after further education may change his opinion, but he be-
lieves that it is one which would be held by the enormous majority of his profession.
It is, however, only fair to say that this is merely one of eight methods, which Pro-
fessor Gregory suggests,0 by which the loss resulting from an accident may be divided
among those who suffer and those who are responsible for it, but it is the one which
Professor Gregory regards as the ideal solution.
One aspect of Professor Gregory's desire to settle in one single action the rights
and liability of all those who are concerned in a single accident, no matter how many
victims and wrongdoers there may be makes his proposed system vulnerable
to criticism. Under it, a defendant against whom an action is brought by any one of
the victims of the accident may not only bring in as defendants those whom he
alleges to share in his responsibility for it, but also all others who are victims
of the accident and, therefore, potential plaintiffs. Furthermore, unless he brings in
his co-defendants, he loses his right to contribution from them. There is undoubtedly
a great advantage in having the liability of all who may be responsible for a
plaintiff's injury determined in a single suit. Difficult questions of res adjudicata are
thereby avoided. On the other hand, doubtful questions of constitutionality are
raised. Clearly, the particular defendant should not lose his right to contribution
unless there is a process by which he can force all his possible co-defendants to join
in the action. Where one of them is a citizen and resident of another state, the power
of the court to require such defendant to join, although supported by the author in a
rather elaborate line of reasoning, is by no means free from doubt.7
Again, if one injured man brings his action and the defendant avails himself of the
procedural provisions of Professor Gregory's proposed act to require all his fellow
sufferers to join in such action, they must join or lose their separate rights of action.
Here also the same constitutional doubts are involved without the compensating ad-
vantage of avoiding difficulties in the application of the principles of the res adjudicata
rule. The choice of a single victim of an accident gives the persons responsible
for it the power to impose upon all the other victims what substantially amounts
to a statute of limitations. While this might be constitutional if applied only
to those upon whom the process could be effectively served and, therefore, to
those possible plaintiffs who were within the state in question, it is more than doubt-
ful whether it could be effective against persons not citizens or residents of such state.
Apart from this, the reviewer believes that it is extremely unlikely that the profession
without intensive education will regard the value of deciding every question that
arises out of a particular accident in one action as a sufficient compensation for re-
quiring every possible plaintiff to litigate his claim when and where the defendant
desires him to do so. Since Professor Gregory's system can be only an academic ideal
until it has been embodied in a statute,8 this provision seems likely to impede its
6. See Chapter IX.
7. See 116-120.
8. Professor Gregory probably has little hopes of the immediate adoption of his pro-
posed act. He offers it rather as a goal at which legal reform should aim. The very fact
that his book raises so many controversial questions adds to its value rather than detracts
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enactment. And any attempt to dissect it from the residue of the suggested act
might well lead to a disfigurement of other parts of the act.
.Much criticism has recently been leveled at the rule which denies contribution
between joint or concurrent tortfeasors. This has resulted in a joint undertaking on
the part of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute, to formulate a statute permitting such contribution which
can be recommended to the several states for adoption. Professor Gregory's sug-
gestions may prove of aid here. For, if one adopts only those which deal with con-
tribution between so-called joint tortfeasors, that is, the just distribution of a loss
caused to an innocent plaintiff by the combined effects of a number of tortious de-
fendants, there is little room for disagreement with Professor Gregory's ideas. One
might suggest that more attention might have been paid to the very difficult problem
which arises when one of two negligent defendants has obtained a release which is so
worded as to amount to nothing more than a covenant not to sue. Professor
Gregory very properly insists that any statute which contemplates contribution be-
between joint tortfeasors should include a provision that a release of one tortfeasor
in the absence of an express statement that the release of all the tortfeasors is
intended, should not have the effect which at common law it now has, of releasing all
the others. If this suggestion is adopted, as it certainly should be in any contribution
statute drafted in the future, the number of cases in which the instant situation arises
will be enormous. A fair solution is outlined in the act recently drafted by the Law
Revision Commission of New York, which provides that any deficiency in the total
amount of damages caused by such a release for an inadequate sum shall be borne by
the plaintiff who has consented to the release and not by the co-tortfeasor who was
not a party to it. This is effected by restricting the damages assessable against the
unreleased tortfeasor to such part of the total damages as between the released de-
fendant and himself, he should bear.
A further problem is presented by the case in which one of two persons whose con-
duct has brought harm upon another stands in such a relation to the other that no
action could be brought against him, as where the negligence of a husband causes
injury to his wife. Professor Gregory believes that in such a case the husband
should contribute to the unrelated tortfeasor so much of the damages as the husband's
culpability makes fair. Of course, he recognizes that he is going beyond the theoretical
area covered by contribution between joint tortfeasors, since "tortfeasor" means one
whose misconduct has made him legally responsible, which is not true of the husband.
However, in a statute this is immaterial. To require the husband to make contribu-
tion, to a certain extent makes him answerable to his wife, though his liability is
indirectly rather than directly enforced. Since automobile accidents are in the field
in which the problem is most likely to arise, the right of contribution would be un-
likely to affect the family relations which the denial of liability is thoretically supposed
to preserve. In almost all such cases the husband, if solvent and, therefore, if
worth suing for contribution, is covered by insurance so that the contest would be
between his insurer and that of his fellow-delinquent. Where there is no insurance
and where, therefore, contribution must come out of the husband's pocket, the effect
of allowing contribution is to relieve the unrelated tortfeasor of a part of his liability
which is transferred to the family group. To this extent the fund applicable to the
support of the family is diminished. It is possible that the wife, though personally
from it. One thing should be said: If his ideal is to be attained in substance, the nece-zary
procedural provisions are worked out with great ability and clarity. The revewer's opinion
on this subject is perhaps of little value. It is, however, reenforced, indeed guaranteed,




enriched at the expense of her husband, may feel aggrieved that through his fault
the family exchequer has been depleted, but this is highly unlikely to create family
dissension, certainly no more so than if the husband were the sole delinquent, and
the wife has to bear without compensation the injury which his carelessness had
inflicted upon the family fortunes.
A possible effect of allowing contribution may be noted. A number of courts have
refused to impose liability upon a defendant where the servant from whose miscon-
duct vicarious responsibility would normally result is a husband or father of the
injured wife or minor child. The reason given is that in theory at least, the master's
right of indemnity makes the liability fall ultimately upon the husband or father
who could not have been made liable, had he and not his master sued., This has been
decided in the teeth of the fact that in all the instances in which recovery has been
denied on this ground, the right of indemnity is of theoretical value only, since the serv-
ant's financial position makes it substantially impossible that any judgment for indem-
nity could be collected. It may be that even the allowance of contribution, which in
effect requires the husband to share in the payment of the damages to which his wife is
entitled, would operate in the same way to relieve a co-delinquent from liability. This
could, of course, be avoided by making the co-delinquent answerable only for such
share of his wife's damages as the extent of his culpability made just. But the effect
of this would be to "impute" the negligence of the husband to the wife as a reason
for denying her full recovery, and this imputation has been consistently denied.
Perhaps the matter had best remain as it is, even though the unrelated tortfeasor is
required to pay more than he otherwise would, had his co-delinquent not stood in an
intimate family relation to the injured person.
The reviewer must confess that one feature provided in the English Act of Parlia-
ment of 1935 seems to him preferable even in contribution cases, if consti-
tutionally possible, to that suggested by Professor Gregory.0 By that Act, the
damages are divided between both joint and co-tortfeasors in proportion to their re-
spective responsibility for the injury for which damages have been paid. But this
proportion is fixed by the court and not by the jury and, in addition, the court is
empowered to enforce indemnity or to deny contribution if the circumstances made
it appear to them that it was just to do so. While the finding of negligence or no
negligence may safely be left to the jury, the reviewer believes that the proportion-
ate extent of the responsibility of the several co-defendants is more likely to be satis-
factorily determined by the court than by the jury.
Furthermore, the power of the court to award either contribution or indemnity as
may appear just, gives to the court an opportunity to review the body of law which
has sprung up around the allowance of indemnity in America. It is the reviewer's
opinion that, while there are a number of instances in which it is just to transfer the
whole burden of liability from one of the two persons against either of whom the
injured person might have enforced his claim, there are many cases in which indem-
nity has been allowed when justice required that the person to whom it was granted
should have borne at least some part of the burden. To avoid the injustice of deny-
ing contribution, courts have often "leaped from the frying pan into the fire" and
have imposed the entire burden upon one whose fault is slightly, if any, greater
than that of the person who is thus relieved from all liability.
9. Professor Gregory has partially covered this point in his Section 13 of his sug-
gested comparative negligence statute, page 168 of his book. In this Section, provision Is
made for the court's apportionment of the responsibility where the jury can not intelligently
do so. This, of course, again would he determined by the judgment of the court which
is given the power to intervene where the situation is one which is likely to beget prejudice
on the part of a lay jury.
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One may or may not agree with the possibility or even the advisability of adopt-
ing all of Professor Gregory's suggestions. But no one interested either in the prob-
lems which underlie contributory negligence or contribution, or in the development
of an efficient procedure for the settlement of tort claims, can fail to profit immensely
by the vast mass of valuable material which the author presents. Particularly those
who are interested in law reform will find in it not only valuable suggestions for
improvement, but also practical guides to the formulation and enactment of statutes
which will rid the law of torts of many of its undesirable features.
FRNCsIS H. Bom.mt
Philadelphia, Pa.
THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE. By Oliver P. Field.' Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1935. pp. xi, 355. $5.
IN A country given to legislative experiment, poor draftsmanship and judicial review
for constitutionality, many statutes are bound to be held unconstitutional. The vary-
ing meanings of the process of "declaring a statute unconstitutional" or unenforce-
able, the meaning of "unconstitutionality", the legal effect of the tainted statute or
its defective part, and of the decision branding it, are the subject matter of this
scholarly and effective book.
Its scope is limited, and wisely so, to a few of the outstanding topics in which
"unconstitutionality" plays a vital role, such as the status of private and of municipal
corporations organized under unconstitutional statutes, the effect of invalid statutes
on the rights and deties of public officers acting under them and on their liability
to private individuals for their action or refusal to act, the effect of unconstitutional
statutory authority on the Government's (state or municipal) liability on public
bonds or promises, and on the duty to repay taxes collected under such invalid au-
thority. While this selection of topics is admittedly fragmentary, it is doubtless
the most practical method of approach. Other chapters deal more generally with par-
ticular legal doctrines incidental to the subject, such as res judicata, stare decisis and
the effect of overruled decisions; the effect of reliance on decisions later overruled;
mistake of law in making payments or performing services; the effect of mandatory
and curative statutes or constitutional amendments on the original defective statute.
The study affords Mr. Field the opportunity for some sagacious criticism on the
peculiar and unsatisfactory operation of judicial review as a governmental institution,
with suggestive proposals for reform, notably, suggested limitations on private initia-
tive in instituting a suit challenging governmental authority in matters not personally
affecting the plaintiff, criticisms of the adventitious and sporadic manifestation of
the process of review, the Government's exposure to private initiative in timing the
challenge and determining its scope, the often prolonged uncertainty as to what the
law is, the court's relative ineffectiveness as a supervisory agency in administration.
Whereas formerly it was common to assume, with Norton 'v. Shelby County 2 that
a statute held "unconstitutional" was void ab initio and created no legal effects-
except possible liability for those who acted under it-a more practical and just
rule has in many instances had to be adopted. The statute is an operative fact, and until
it is declared "unconstitutional'--and there are many types of invalidity-it is unsafe
IProfessor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
2. 118 U. S. 425 (1886).
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to disregard it. Vested interests are created under it, positions are changed, often
irretrievably. Considerations of common sense and equity have therefore developed
a variety of rules to temper an assumed logic with justice, and to protect many
interests that have arisen in reliance on such tainted statutes. This more flexible
view has given both color and uncertainty to a developing field of law and affords
a rich opportunity for the social and legal reformer to criticize narrowmindedness
and, with much support from enlightened opinions, to guide reform. Doctrines,
principles and rules have been invented or evolved by courts to rationalize and
explain their departure from rigid adherence to the void ab initio theory, such as the
de facto doctrine in the matter of corporations, the rules of estoppel by conduct,
effect of mistake of law or fact, unjust enrichment, immunity from collateral attack,
equitable distribution of risk. Not that the void ab initio doctrine has no place.
Quite the contrary. Few duties of specific performance or criminal penalties can
arise out of an unconstitutional statute; recovery on invalid bonds is rare. But
a tainted statute is generally unenforced in a particular case only, it may or may
not have wider effects, depending on its nature and non-judicial considerations; in
another case it may be valid, a change of circumstances may produce a change of
decision; the defect fiaay be curable by amendment. 3 Mr. Field suggests that the
courts should, besides their negative rejection, include affirmative indications of the
effect of their decision, or, in lieu of the inevitable piecemeal and haphazard
"vetoes," there should be constant administrative-judicial supervision as a guide
to legislation and administration. Others also have pointed out the disadvantages
of sporadic and closely limited judicial review and have asked more help from the
courts as legislative guides. 4 But given the trial by combat as the framework of
the judicial process in government, we shall have either to broaden the scope of
judicial review and modify the method of invoking judicial relief, or else insert be-
tween the administration and the courts an administrative reviewing hierarchy which
shall afford guidance to legislator and administrator on a wider scale than the narrow
issues raised in litigation. In any event, however, governmental authorities have not
yet realized the opportunity they possess for initiating the occasion and scope of judi-
cial review by themselves suing contesting corporations or individuals or even
public authorities for a declaratory judgment of their challenged powers, as is done
in England and the Dominions. That also is the indicated method for officers,
doubtful of the legality of the authorizing statute or of their proposed invasion of
private right, to raise the issue judicially, especially in the face of so antiquated a
rule, as that on mandamus the question of constitutionality cannot be raised. Title
to office is now frequently thus chalenged.r In the distribution of risks when an
unconstitutional trespass has taken place, neither the officer nor the citizen should bear
the risks of the legislature's mistake, but where practical this should fall on the
community as a whole. 6 In this connection we find no reference to the important
case of State v. McCook,7 invalidating some 1500 Connecticut statutes and to Pro-
fessor Walter F. Dodd's analytical discussion of the effect of curative legislation.8
The fact that several of the chapters of this book have appeared in periodical arti-
cles, is no deterrent either to the unity or practicality of the treatment. Mr. Field
has opened a most fruitful area to further inquiry and to corrective judicial and
legislative therapeutics. His part of the task has been performed with signal
success. EDWIn B0RCi, '
New Haven, Conn.
3. See Comment (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 373; (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1101.
4. See Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal (1934) 47 HARv. L. RE.v 913.
5. pp. 79-83. 6. p. 130.
7. 109 Conn. 621 (1929). 8. (1929) 3 CONN. B. J. 217.
tProfessor of Law, yale Law School.
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TuE STORY OF CONGRESS 1789-1935. By Ernest Sutherland Bates.' New York:
Harper, 1936. pp. ix, 468. $3.
IR. BATES notes that, with one negligible predecessor, his book is the first of its
kind, that "a consecutive history of Congress" has not hitherto been written. That
there is a place for a good history of Congress is true, and it is odd that no serious
attempt should have been made before to tell its story. Mr. Bates, then, has on
our attention and patience the claims of the pioneer. But his book, highly readable
as it is, does not, it is to be feared, quite fill the gap that Mr. Bates has noted. In
the first place, Mr. Bates has not made up his mind what he means by "the story of
Congress." Such a story may tell of the life of Congress as a corporate body with
its own vicissitudes of fortune, its own changing ethos, its own altering sense of its
powers and duties, its own mechanism of existence. In the strict sense of the term
that is the story of Congress and that story Mr. Bates has almost entirely neglected.
Fundamental to an understanding of the working of Congress, and hence to its story,
is a clear statement of the development of the business methods of both houses;
without some outline of procedure, of the role of committees, of the mechanics of
legislative leadership, the common reader will be (or ought to be) at a loss to under-
stand much of what was done in Congress. Yet Mr. Bates gives him little help;
there are references to a few high-lights, to the tyranny of Speaker Cannon for in-
stance, to more recent alterations in the rules of the House, to some celebrated fili-
busters, but the forces behind these dramatic incidents, the political necessities or
conveniences that led to such different methods of business in House and Senate, all
these really illuminating aspects of the problem, are left on one side. And, more-
over, this story neglects what one would have thought indispensable elementary data
about Congress, such as the working of the decennial apportionment with its interest
for the politician, the moralist and the arithmetician. How big Congress was at any
one time, what interests were most powerfully represented in it are too often left
to the reader's guess, his only help a few commonplaces about the loss of power
to the South that marked the period before the Civil War. We hear a little about
nepotism in recent Congresses, but nothing about the growth of the House and
Senate office systems, the elaborate material equipment that makes it plain to the
visitor to Washington that here is a parliamentary system whose humblest members
are not mere helots like those who are uncomfortably crushed into a little room
at Westminster.
Mir. Bates has not written the "Story of Congress," but the story of American poli-
tics seen mainly (though not exclusively) from the congressional standpoint. That
approach and the adoption of Congresses as a method of division for his book alone
serve to differentiate this from other political histories of the United States. And
what are the merits of the book as a political history? They are considerable. Mr.
Bates is a clear and, at times, a vivid writer; he has a keen ear for true and for false
rhetoric and uses specimens of both to good effect. His own policital views are
farxian and, though such a cut-and-dried approach obviously has its drawbacks, as
when it results in a condemnation of Jacksonian democracy as merely petty bour-
geois, as if there was in the America of 1828 a chance for any other form of politico-
economic organization, the possession of such a view point does save Mr. Bates from
merely factual and profitless narrative. But despite his merits as a narrator, ir.
Bates has faults that make his book less useful than it could easily have been. He
makes no pretence to original learning over a great part of the field, wisely availing
himself "of every tunnel through the mountains excavated by preceding historians."
So far so good, but Mr. Bates does not tell us what tunnels he is using at any given
moment and, as there are often rival tunnels, the result is awkward. At times, ho,-
1. Author, Tils LAND or LimRT" (1930).
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ever, one can guess. Thus the last section of the book seems to owe a good deal to
Mr. Bowers' Beveridge and the Progressive Movement. But it is not always easy to
be sure, as Mr. Bates is inclined to neglect the pedantic accuracy that is sometimes
the saving grace of very dull professional historians. One can never be certain
therefore, at any given moment, whether a rather novel point of view or a brisk dis-
missal of a complicated question is due to a long pondered decision on the evidence
(even the second-hand evidence of the tunnellers) or is simply an example of the
slap-dash way that Mr. Bates has with such well-known facts as the dispute with
Chile over the treatment of sailors from the U. S. S. Baltimore, here attributed to
Venezuela. This slip makes it less easy to believe that when Mr. Bates talks of
ousting the "conservatives" he has really thought over the question of whether the
partisans of Balmaceda were really the conservatives, no matter what they called
themselves. The second revolution that made things easy for President Harrison,
may be simply a heightened way of describing a ministerial change. More serious
are the doubts raised by the treatment of Stephen Douglas. It may be argued that
the rehabilitation of Douglas has gone too far, that he was not the semi-hero of
Beveridge or the whole hero of Mr. George Fort Milton; but in reading Mr. Bates'
account one is forced to wonder whether the author is reacting against Beveridge,
let us say, or is merely following Henry Wilson or even James Ford Rhodes. Un-
certainties of this kind niake one wonder whether it is Mr. Bates' considered opinion,
or merely another example of his determined dislike of ante-bellum Southern Demo-
crats, reflected in his assertion that, in the debates with Lincoln, Douglas "found
himself outmatched by an opponent who answered sophistry with logic, rhetoric with
sincerity, and vulgar sneers with equally vulgar but far funnier jests." Such doubts
increase on reading. The account of the Dred Scott case, where Scott is said to have
"been taken from the slave state of Missouri to the free state of Minnesota" and
in which the Supreme Court is declared to have asserted that "Negroes had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect." It is not the minor errors in
fact (which are sufficiently numerous), but the positive assertion on great issues,
of views which are unaccepted, to say the least, by scholarly opinion2 which make
one wonder whether Mr. Bates' book in its present form, stimulating as it may be for
anyone equipped with an elementary knowledge of the outline of American political
history, is going to be so useful to the common reader for whom, presumably, it is
mainly designed. Mr. Bates has written a readable book; with a little more care
and thought he could have written an indispensable one.
D. W. BROGANf
Oxford, England.
COMMONS DEBATEs 1621. Edited by Wallace Notestein,1 Helen Relf2 and Hartly
Simpson.3 New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935. Seven volumes, pp. xxiv,
343; 545; vii, 473; 448; 534; 482; xv, 658. $35.
THE occasion of this third parliament of James I was the imminent loss of the
Palatinate to the Catholic powers in the.Thirty Years' War. Though the session
opened with good will towards the Crown, sharp differences developed in respect to
religion, monopolies, foreign policy, immunity of the King's ministers from parlia-
mentary chastisement, and the privileges of the House of Commons. The conclud-
ing event was the famous protestation of the Commons asserting that "the liberties,
2. E.g., the origins of the neutrality proclamation of 1793.
tFellow of Corpus Christi College.
1. Professor of History, Yale University. 2. Profess
3. Research Assistant, Yale University.
or of History, Wells College,
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franchises, privileges, and jurisdictions of Parliament are the ancient and undoubted
birthright and inheritance of the subjects of England; and that the arduous and
urgent affairs concerning the king, state, and defence of the realm, and of the church
of England, and the maintenance and making of laws, and redress of mischiefs and
grievances .. . are proper subjects and matters of counsel and debate in Parlia-
ment."4 The King's answer was to tear the protestation from the journal of the
House and dissolve parliament.
The history of this parliament has been known to historians, not as it seemed
inadequately, through the old Parliamentary History,5 the Journals of both Houses,
Nicholas's Proceedings and Debates in the House of Commons in 1620 and 1621,0
and Elsing's Notes of the Debates in the House of Lords, 1621, edited by Gardiner
in 1870 and recently supplemented by other notes of the Lords debates discovered
and edited by Miss Relf.7 Some material passages have been enshrined in printed
collections, such as those of Rushworth, Rymer, and the Calendars of State Papers.
From these and from other sources in manuscript Gardiner built up his long, cir-
cumstantial narrative of this parliament, in which later historians have generally
concurred as to events, though not invariably as to interpretations and judgments.
That unpublished diaries and notes existed in sufficient bulk to fill five stout
octavos is surprising and even a little disconcerting. In all the editors have unearthed
fourteen accounts of this parliament, of which three are very substantial. The first,
dubbed X, is a compilation whose origin remains a mystery. The second is a diary
by Sir Thomas Barrington, which begins late, April 17, and ends early, November 27,
but for the period covered is as nearly verbatim as longhand could achieve. Third,
an account by John Pym is of great value by reason both of its authorship and its
lucidity. Like that of Barrington, it stops soon after the Houses came together in
November, following the adjournment-when we should so like to have it continue.
Of the four accounts in Vol. V, that found among the Belasyse papers and that by
John Smyth of Nibley are more summary but still highly useful, while those of
Sir Thomas Wentworth and Sir Nathaniel Rich cover, alas, only the first month.
Vol. VI includes several fragmentary accounts, and Vol. VII provides appendices
which contain the texts of bills, records bearing on the patents of monopoly, and
miscellaneous papers. There is an index which on cursory examination seems as
impeccable as it is given indices to be. The reviewer would have been grateful for
the elementary aid of a list of members with their constituencies which does not
appear. But the editors have apparently assumed that those who consult these vol-
umes will have the older published accounts at hand. This explains certain omis-
sions, as for example, of the protestation quoted above. There is a list of precedents
in case and statute cited during debates which bristled with precedents. The House
of Commons was finding itself compelled to take up new ground and claim it as
old ground, a procedure in which, as is generally the case, precedents were the
armory.
In their introduction the editors discuss the authorship, merits, and peculiarities
of the several accounts, but expressly postpone consideration of the history and issues
of this parliament and of the activities of the leaders, until the materials which they
have collected for the parliament of 1624 shall be published, since it would involve
much repetition to treat the two parliaments separately. Only a rash and hasty
reviewer would anticipate the editors on these points. And the present reviewer
will hazard only a few very safe observations.
Publication of so much additional material bearing on this parliament necessarily
involves correction and revaluation of that which has long been in print. Of mis-
4. PRo"E. o, Docua-,,rs (1894) 313-314. S. 1761.
6. 1766. 7. 1929.
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takes and omissions in the Commons Journals the editors speak critically in the
introduction, but admit nonetheless that "with all these diaries we have been grateful
again and again for needed details yielded by the jottings of the Clerk . . . in the
long run that official put down more speeches than any one else. He has long
been the dependence of the historians and his usefulness has not ended." 8
How usefully the new diaries supplement and correct one another in building
up a full account of happenings as they occurred may readily be tested. For
example, the events of April 24 were recorded by X, Barrington, Pym, the
Belasyse manuscript, Smyth and Holland. On that day the House was engaged
in passing bills on a miscellany of subjects when Sir Lionel Cranfield, Master of the
Wards, rose to report a message from the King. He had been charged to explain
to James the necessity (as the House saw it) of continuing the parliamentary inves-
tigation of patents of monopoly, notwithstanding the King's attempt to forestall it
by proclamation. Cranfield's report of the angry words by which James attempted
to protect both the referees who had certified to the legality of the grants, and-
more half-heartedly-the patentees who had profited by them, was followed by a
heated debate which was with difficulty calmed. The House then resumed consideration
of the patent for licensing inns. X, Pym, and the Belasyse diary give brief sum-
maries of Cranfield's speech, but fail to suggest the excitement aroused by the royal
reply, nor do they recoid the hot words of Mallory and others against those in-
formers who in advance of the House's messenger had so prejudiced the King's mind.
They do not mention Sir Francis Seymour's attack on the Lord Treasurer who as
Chief Justice had been a referee for the patent for licensing inns. Sir Edward Mon.
tagu's defense of his brother is likewise omitted. Smyth too is reticent, merely
mentioning Seymour's "bold speech againe touchynge the Tresorer." But Barring-
ton and Holland give full and vivid accounts in which the flying angry words are
caught as they were spoken. If Gardiner had read these diaries he would have
understood why Mallory (with Coke and Phelips) was sent to the Tower at the
dose of the session. If he had read all the diaries he might have detected a fighting
spirit in the House, and modified his emphasis on its humble demeanor towards the
King. It is possible that he might have seen reason to broaden the scope and alter
the proportions of his narrative, allowing for factors to which he gave but slight
attention, the commercial depression, for instance, in the midst of which this par-
liament was meeting. Like many great historians Gardiner erred on the side of
simplification. Perusal of these diaries which reflect so vividly the unselected con-
fusions and preoccupations of this year reminds us that history is richer and more
disorderly than the books would have us suppose.
If religion, monopolies, and the privileges of the House were the subjects which
most excited the emotions of members, many others received their serious atten-
tion. The decay of trade was assiduously investigated in committee hearings and
a number of bills were introduced to reform conditions deemed injurious. Certain
of these foreshadowed mercantilist policies destined to reach the statute book many
years later: navigation acts, corn laws, regulation of the tobacco trade, the exclu-
sion of Irish cattle. The battle of the chartered trading companies was fought in
this as in other Stuart parliaments.
Towards strengthening its constitutional position as against the royal preroga-
tive, this parliament made more consistent progress than it has been credited with by
historians. The dogged insistence of the House on freedom of speech as an unassail-
able right; its firm attitude in demanding the release of members sequestered or
detained, whatever the pretext; the successful assertion of its right to decide the
8. I, 101.
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legality of election returns by which members were qualified to sit, to determine
its own order of business, and to adjourn by its own action; the assertion of its
competence to deal with all matters of public concern; its refusal to admit that
royal proclamations had the force of law, and its evident desire to place limits on
the dispensing power; the mixture of independence and deference in dealing with the
Lords which enabled the Commons to turn an awkward corner in Floyd's case; its
resumption after long disuse of the right to hear and to bring accusations of mis-
conduct against the King's ministers. All this is well attested by these debates. In
them, one perceives the change that was taking place in the Speaker's position: he
was reprimanded when he acted arbitrarily or as the King's servant, and was
reminded that his whole duty was to the House. During this parliament, the ma-
chinery of committees was made more efficient and the rules of the House were
elaborated.
Time was lacking to carry through the survey and codification of statute law
begun in the preceding parliament on suggestion of the Council, and promptly
brought to the attention of this parliament by Sir Edward Coke in a motion
"that the chiefe Lawyers of the Howse maye survey the statutes to see which
laws are expired, which not, which obsolette, which repealed by subsequent cross
statutes, which fitt to be repealed, which fitt to be continued; and though it
be a worke of great time and Labor, yet it beinge in some readines by the
private studie of Sergaunt Finch, the labours of Recorder Finch, Hackwell, who
by the appointment of the howse the last convention of parliament upon letters from
the counsell, bestowed some paines in it, maye be brought to a period before the
end of parliament." 9
Reform of the courts and of judicial procedure was likewise taken in hand under
the leadership of Coke, and the struggle of the common law courts against the
equity and prerogative courts was now transferred from the courts themselves to the
floor of the House of Commons. "The lower howse of parliament," declared the Master
of the Wards, "hath not authoritie to determine Jurisdiction of Courts, it belongs to the
prerogative of Kinge. Wee may enquire and complaine, as in case of grievances,
but reformation onelie can be by the kinge." To which Alford replied: "Jurisdic-
tion of courts are to be limited by parliament, parliamcntum omnia potest except
alteringe the right line of the Crowne." 10 Revelations which caused the fall of
the Lord Chancellor Bacon exposed the Court of Chancer, in particular, to the
reforming zeal of the House which launched bills to limit drastically its jurisdic-
tion, personnel and fees. But the reforms now contemplated by the Commons com-
prehended redress of abuses in the common law courts, the ecclesiastical courts and
the justices of peace. A glance at the bills and breviates of bills in Appendix A of
volume vii will show the tenor of some of these projected reforms. That the diaries
throw much fresh light on Coke's leadership in this and in the political and consti-
tutional issues of the session, goes without saying.
The publication of these Debates is an event of which American scholarship, Yale
University and Wells College may justly be proud. The labors of search, transcrip-
tion, study and arrangement have taken years of the editors' lives, and by their
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THE DAIRY INDUSTRY AND THE A. A. A. By John D. Black.1  Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1935. pp. xiv, 513. $3.
THE assortment of milk decisions which have been handed down by the Supreme
Court in the last two years2 gives to this book a persuasive interest. It is true that
all of the cases passed upon by the court related to regulation by a state milk control
board; despite the volume of actions pertaining to the AAA milk agreements, none of
them was pushed beyond the circuit courts. Nevertheless the processing tax case
though it did not directly affect these agreements, rocked the legal foundations
of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and hastened a change, already im-
pending, in federal regulation of milk. Agreements are now being superseded by
orders which are expected to differ but slightly from the older system of control.
In consequence, a review of the operation.of the AAA is not merely of historical
relevance; the knowledge gained from that experiment will have a guiding effect in
future efforts at control.
Mr. Black's efforts to damn the dairy "New Deal" was hindered by the state
of public ignorance about the industry. To calculate the effects of a program, one has
to know something about the thing affected. A large portion of the book is devoted
to analysis of the milk industry prior to government intervention. This is not an
account of the growth of trade usages which give to the fluid milk market its dis-
tinctive organization, but is a parade of the data against the background of the
classical economic theory of perfect competition. The assumptions, with some
minor qualifications, are that milk is an open industry, that the laws of supply and
demand operate in the approved manner, and that the market is for the most part
free and competitive.
The industrial facts deny the relevance of such classical premises. It is even an
anachronism to speak of the AAA as government intervention; we have Mr. Justice
Roberts' word that there is probably no business, save the railroads, which has been
"so thoroughly regimented and regulated" by the state as the milk industry.4 A
community may derive its milk supply only from the farms which have been in-
spected by the local health department. An initial limitation of the market is ac-
corded by the state in the interest of public health; the economic consequence of
such state regulation has been to split what might have been a national market
into a series of distinct and isolated segments. Their provinciality quickened the
community of interest among distributors, and "gentlemen's agreements" regarding
price were not uncommon. In protest the producers organized; they wished to get
in at the point where the bargains were being made. Upon their intervention, price
finally left the open market and became subject to the pressures of collective bar-
gaining.
This kind of private control of price introduced industrial practices remote from
the conventional price theory of perfect competition. A multiple price is paid for
1. Professor of Economics, Harvard University.
2. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1933); Hegeman Farms v. Baldwin, 293 U. S.
163 (1934); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935); Borden's Farm Products v, Ten
Eyck, 56 Sup. Ct. 453 (1936); Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 56 Sup. Ct. 457 (1936).
3. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
4. His amplification of that statement included, among others, the right of the state
to quarantine herds against bovine tuberculosis, exclude the importation of dairy cattle
suffering from Bang's disease, regulate the conditions under which milk is produced, Inspect
pasteurization plants, and legislate widely "to promote cleanlinesm and fair trade practices




identical units of a commodity selling in a single market. Raw milk is divided into
classes representing their prospective use as fluid milk, butter, cheese and other pro-
ducts; farmers' payments vary with the hypothetical use to which their milk is put.
Fluid milk, first sheltered by farm inspection, is further buttresssed by the utilization
payment plan. The supposed function of the price mechanism is to slow or speed con-
sumption so as to bring about an equilibrium of supply and demand. But in fluid milk
there is no excess of supply to stimulate decreases in price. The members of the in-
dustry meet and agree upon price; this price evokes a certain demand and the supply is
then rationed off to fit the demand. What is left over, is shifted to "surplus" products
-butter and other commodities-those markets are national, free and compatitive.
A stern protection of the fluid market has as its price a national dumping ground for
milk manufactures.
Without considering the implications of this private control of the market, Mr.
Black engages in the heroic task of adjusting the milk industry to competitive norms.
The "fundamental reason" for a multiple price for producers is mechanical; it
represents the "difference in cost of transporting milk, cream and butter." And this
assertion is made despite the fact that freight charges are often fictitious assess-
ments of the dealer; that cream from Wisconsin can and does undersell Eastern
cream; and that it would be cheaper to import milk from the Middlewest dairy areas
than to produce it in New England.
Mr. Black urges rightly that the conformance with inspection requirements adds
materially to the farmers' cost of production. But that a pecuniary calculus or even
the "psychological traits and attitudes" peculiar to farmers control their entrance
to the fluid market is less than correct. The state itself may be unwilling to
inspect. The local health departments have only limited funds. Through the inter-
pretation of requirements they have frankly betrayed their eagerness to reserve the
remunerative fluid markets for farmers adjacent and within state borders. In Bal-
timore this is crowned by statute: no milk can be shipped in for fluid use which is
produced outside a fifty mile zone about the city. Of course the rationale for
these actions is never economic; the state in its sovereign exercise of the police power
is protecting the public health. Yet the economic consequences of such policy are
to limit competition by erecting a wall around the fluid market.
Superimposed upon the notion of free competition is the acceptance in this book
of the fact that the milk industry has some "monopoly" features. In many markets,
prices for fluid milk held through 1932 while other milk products and agricultural
commodities in general dropped sharply. This is attributed to a producers' "monopo-
ly." The dilemma of the distributor is portrayed in poignant terms: "the producers
association has only to refuse to supply him with milk and he is well-nigh helpless.'
Yet Mir. Black must know that milk constitutes a buyer's market. It is too perishable
a stuff for producers to hold; to have value, it must be disposed of immediately.
The dealers are not impelled to such impulsive action; if consumers will not take
their wares in bottle form, it can be processed into more enduring milk products.
For these, of course, lower prices are received but the competitive burden is shifted
to farmers in lower prices for raw milk. Many producers' organizations are simply-
"bargaining cooperatives"; their sole function is to battle over prices. This concen-
tration on price puts them in a weak strategic position for bargaining purposes. They-
have no way of disposing of supplies except through distributors. Consequently, it
must always be their concern to maintain friendly relations with "helpless" dealers.
A- discussion that runs in terms of an elementary conceptual formula of compe-
tition and monopoly fails to give an adequate picture of the industry. The usages
and arrangements cannot be dismissed in clauses modifying a well-worn hypothesis;
they are an integral part of the industry and essential to its understanding. And their
omission cloaks the underlying continuity between a market first privately and then
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publicly controlled. Many of the sections in the marketing agreements are startling
simply because they seek to use industrial patterns already in existence. And it
might further be argued that two or three years is not enough for evaluation of
so complex a control as the milk industry calls for. Any new experiment must
leave room for trial-and-error methods and even for a changing policy as experience is
accumulated; Mr. Black makes these fundamental errors in the control itself.
The problem is not one that will die quickly. The milkshed does not conform to
the political boundaries of the state; and the effect of Baldwin v. Seelig was to
place an effective milk control beyond the powers of the state. More federal experi.
ments undoubtedly will follow and these will be reviewed by the courts. The Nebbia
decision and those following indicate how little the judiciary is acquainted with the
industrial facts in the milk trade. In all of these, the Court was united in its belief
that the regulation at issue was furthering the competitive norm; the difference
between the minority and majority was simply in the manner of its accomplishment.
A more factual analysis in economic treatises might be a forward step in bringing
realism to the judicial decision.
IRENE TILLf
Washington, D. C.
RECHT UND SrrTTLICHKEIT. By Rudolph Laun.1 Berlin: Springer, 1935. pp. 109.
THIs book consists of a paper first published in 1924, and of five new essays which
elaborate and further develop the thesis of the original paper. It contains an entire
philosophy of law, set forth in the traditionally dogmatic fashion of German specu-
lative writing. The main thesis, that law is the autonomous cognition by the indi-
vidual of what is moral, will sound strange to the American reader. However, the
more unaccustomed one is to this viewpoint, the more stimulating it may prove to be.
Laun starts from Kant's legal philosophy. Kant teaches that, while morality is
autonomous, existing absolutely for the individual, law is heteronomous, that is, given
by an outside agency. Laun asks who the giver of that heteronomous law might
be. He declines to believe in an absolute natural law, be it divine or rational. Fof
him the state remains as sole lawmaker. At first glance, this view seems to imply
an extreme positivism, leaving no distinction between law and force, right and wrong.
But Laun refuses to accept this result. He does not doubt that there is imrichtiges
Recht, unjust law. In order dialetically to justify his contention, he decided to cor-
rect Kant's teachings. He declares that law like morality is autonomous. He con-
cludes that true law and morality are therefore the same.
The significance of this doctrine is obvious. Laun shares the opinion of the well-
known German "Free Law" movement, that there is not only one positive law, given
by legislatures or inherited from prior generations, but that there must be another
source of law creating new rules and supplanting obsolete ones. However, the ques-
tions that Laun endeavors to answer are broader in scope than those asked by the
Free Law movement and most of its successors. Kantorowicz, Heck, Stoll, and others
are interested in ascertain-ing gaps in the law and filling them by newly made law.
Laun is asking more generally: What is the nature of the law? He wants to know
how to distinguish legal rules from mere enforced orders, right from wrong.
Today, this general question is not so easily answered as it was when one still could
believe in the existence of some absolute system of law. Sociology has taught us
,Member of Staff, Cabinet Committee on Price Policy.
1. Professor of Law, University of Hamburg.
1542 (Vol. 45
1936] BOOK REVIEWS
that human knowledge is relative and irrevocably associated with its origins in some
particular society. Since Laun cannot escape that fact, he is further and definitely
compelled to depart from the idealism of Kant. He states that the autonomous cog-
nition of what is just law consists of the moral approval or disapproval of some
concrete act. Legal rules are made only by induction from that concrete cognition.
This thesis has often been proposed and has always been met by the criticism that
such resort to subjective opinions, to the Rcchtsgejuchl, would lead to legal anarchy.
Laun, aware of that criticism, seeks further support for it by asserting his belief in
a transcendental moral order of the world dominated by a cognition of what is
just. The effect of this order is gradually to supplant blind obedience with a col-
lective sense of duty. Thus a certain conformity to law exists, which, however, is
not at all complete. There are always men without conscience and-as Laun says-
there are "ethical sceptics" like those who believe in the ultimate value of races
and nations. The conception of what is just law, according to Laun, is a mass
phenomenon. It can be observed if one looks at the legal conviction of the nation
(Volk) as the creative source of all law.2 This is not meant to be a return to the
romanticism of the historical school of law.3 For Laun points to the permanent
majority which supports the ruling authority in a nation as the group whose opinion
one must examine in orcTer to ascertain what is just law. Laun dares to make this
reference to the "supporting majority," because he believes in an optimistic philoso-
phy of history which describes the development of the nations in terms of a tendency
to progress away from force and towards justice and morality.
This elaborate structure of legal philosophy is doubtless compatible with most of
the accepted doctrines of present day continental jurisprudence. It is true that
we no longer can resort to natural law. Likewise it is true that we cannot accept
as just law everything which claims to be positive law. Moreover, it seems to the
reviewer that Laun is right in contending that some autonomous cognition 'of what
is just in a concrete situation enters the process of finding the law. But Laun's
resort to the "supporting majorities" of nations for the purpose of identifying this
absolute element is open to criticism. Certainly we cannot rely on individual judg-
ments and must resort to observations of mass phenomena. Granted also, that we
have to look in the first place to the mores of the people; no doubt, we thereby
recognize a prevailing national element in the law. But Laun cannot be followed when
he finally asserts what amounts to an irrebuttable presumption in favor of what the
"Volk" says. What, then, was the purpose of building up this entire structure of
an autonomous law if no appeal can be taken to it from the voice of the permanent
supporting majority. We have to ask what will happen if people tamper with the
national legal conscience. We know that history has often experienced mass psychoses
which lasted for entire generations. Economic pressure might pervert the appear-
ance of the conscience. What shall legal science rely on in the presence of propa-
ganda and the absence of the means for forming a mass conscience?
More generally, the reader is tempted to question the usefulness of a purely dog-
matic approach to the philosophical problems of law making. However, the book
develops its theses on a very broad basis and impresses the reader with the Ecope
of the problem it poses: what is the relation between law and morality, and how
can it be made closer and more fruitful?
RUDoLF M.L1AEt
New York, N. 
Y.
2. 91 et seq.
3. For a detailed exposition of Laun's theory of the Nation, see his "L.% D ocR,%rTi"
(1933).
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THE LAw AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION. Volume II, TuE CROWN. By Sir
William Anson. Fourth Edition by A. Berriedale Keith. Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1935. In two parts: part I, xxi, 325; part II, xv, 414. £1. 10.
THE first volume of Anson's classic work on Parliament was reedited in 1922, but
volume two, last issued in 1907, has long been unobtainable. That a treatise which
first appeared forty-three years ago can still bear republishing demonstrates both the
stability of the B~ritish constitution and the genius of Sir William Anson. In this
edition, Professor Keith has made only changes which seemed essential. He has added
brief accounts of such developments as the War Cabinet, the Civil Service, the Air
Ministry, the Ministry of Health, the Road Fund and the Unemployment Insurance
Fund, and the Imperial Defense Committee. He has in some instances modified
Anson's text so as to take care of recent changes, or to clarify an explanation. Other
modifications represent new interpretations, and judgments that differ from Anson's.
He is for instance less provincial in his outlook with respect to Ireland and Scotland
than was Anson, especially in discussing the Act of Union; he is more critical of
Victoria, and more aware of the pressure of party upon members of Parliament.
Professor Keith has in addition made material contributions of his own which
increase the value of these volumes. He has entirely rewritten Anson's summary
description of the Empire of India, and, besides indicating changes in the status of
various colonies and protectorates, has added a new section on the Dominions.
Enlightening passages not found in previous editions have been written on certain
significant developments of the modem constitution, such as the legislative power of
the executive, the judicial functions of the executive, and the control of the executive
by the courts.. A thorough treatment is also afforded the problem of the rights and
liberties, especially those of property, of the English citizens as affected by modern
trends. And to a far greater extent than Anson, Keith cites cases bearing on constitu-
tional points, largely basing the new sections on such decisions. He lists nearly five
hundred, of which two hundred occurred since 1907.
It is in his treatment of the historical sections, so large and important a part of the
original treatise, that fault can be found with Professor Keith's editing. Much has
been written on various aspects of the constitution since Anson wrote, and yet Pro-
fessor Keith has almost uniformly retained Anson's text and interpretations. He does
cite some eighty recent secondary works in the notes, of which twelve are his own, and
about thirty deal with modem or twentieth century subjects, such as Lord Oxford's
Fifty Years of Parliament, Lee's Edward VII, Fitzroy's Memoirs, and C. K. Allen's
Bureaucracy Triumphant. About twenty-five concern pre-nineteenth century topics.
But Baldwin's The King's Council and Tanner's Tudor Constitutional Documents are
the only sources from which are drawn ideas that modify the original text. The others
are often used merely as authority, and for statements which Anson made before tbey
were written. Anson's long chapter on the Privy Council and the Cabinet is re-
tained with few changes, and the article which Anson himself wrote in 1914 on the
origins of the cabinet is disregarded. Turner's The Cabinet Council, but not his Privy
Council, is cited; Mark Thomson's Secretaries of State, but not Mrs. Higham's splen-
did treatise. Aifd Stubbs is still cited as the only authority on medieval revenue.
New Haven, Conn. Stanley Pargellis'
1. Professor of Sanskrit and Lecturer on the Constitution, University of Edinburgh.
tAssistant Professor of History, Yale University.
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